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We use a standard of living (SoL) approach to estimate older people’s disability costs, using data on
8000 individuals from the U.K. Family Resources Survey. We extend previous research in two ways.
First, by allowing for a more ﬂexible relationship between SoL and income, the structure of the
estimated disability cost and equivalence scale is not dictated by a restrictive functional form assump-
tion. Second, we allow for the latent nature of disability and SoL, addressing measurement error in the
disability and SoL indicators in surveys. We ﬁnd that disability costs are strongly related to severity of
disability, and vary with income in absolute and proportionate terms. Older people above the median
disability level require an extra £99 per week (2007 prices) on average to reach the SoL of an otherwise
similar person at the median. Costs faced by older people in the highest decile of disability average £180.
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1. Introduction
Disabled people experience signiﬁcant additional costs as a consequence of
their disability. This is recognized in social security systems through the provision
of beneﬁts designed to compensate for disability-related consumption costs. There
is no consensus on the scale of these costs (Stapleton et al., 2008) and thus it is hard
to assess how far social security systems compensate for them in practice. In the
U.K., older people with disabilities may be entitled to one of two social security
beneﬁts which are intended to help with the extra costs of disability: Attendance
Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance (DLA). AA can be claimed only
by people aged 65 and over; DLA must be claimed before reaching age 65, but if
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awarded, can continue past age 65.1 AA is paid at one of two rates depending on
level of disability or care needs. DLA has a care component and a mobility
component. The care component is payable at one of three levels corresponding to
different degrees of care need; the mobility component is paid at one of two rates
according to mobility needs.2 About a quarter of people aged 65 and over receive
AA or DLA (Hancock and Pudney, 2013). The beneﬁts are not means tested
although they can trigger additional entitlements to means-tested beneﬁts through
a Severe Disability Premium.3 People with care needs may also be entitled to
publicly-funded and largely means-tested social care in their own homes or in care
homes. Such care is received by only 6 percent of the older population (Wittenberg
et al., 2011). There is continuing international debate on how best to fund the
care needs of growing numbers of older people (Da Roit and Le Bihan, 2010;
Gleckman, 2010; Swartz et al., 2012). The role of cash disability beneﬁts in the
overall system of public support for care needs is an important part of this debate.
It is therefore important to have methods to derive evidence on the extent to which
the levels of cash disability beneﬁts compensate for the extra costs that different
degrees of disability bring. Moreover, when carrying out analysis of the distribu-
tional impact of tax and social security beneﬁt reforms, it is crucially important to
make some allowance for these additional living costs. If disability beneﬁts are
included in income, failure to do so would give a misleadingly favorable view of the
position of disabled people in the income distribution (Hancock and Pudney,
2013).
At least ﬁve different methods have been used to estimate and adjust for the
costs of disability. One is to exploit the existing beneﬁt system and assume that the
political process has resulted in an acceptable evaluation of disability costs. This
implies use of an income measure for distributional analysis which excludes any
receipt of disability beneﬁt (see Hancock and Pudney, 2013; Hancock et al., 2013),
on the assumption that income from disability beneﬁt is exactly offset by the extra
costs of disability. However, in practice such payments follow simple rules not well
tailored to each individual’s speciﬁc conﬁguration of impairments and they are not
necessarily intended to meet the full costs of disability. There may also be imper-
fections in the eligibility judgments made by program administrators and non-
take-up by potential claimants. Consequently, this approach may give a poor
approximation to disability costs, with underestimation in many cases, leading to
bias in distributional analysis. Clearly it cannot be used to assess the adequacy of
existing disability beneﬁt levels.
A second, judgment-based, approach attempts to estimate the disability
costs by asking a panel of “experts,” or disabled people themselves, to identify
disability-related costs: see Martin and White (1988), Thompson et al. (1990), and
Smith et al. (2004) for examples of this approach. The difﬁculty here is that the
appropriate costs may depend not only on the nature of the impairments suffered
by the individual, but also other characteristics that vary across households, and it
1From April 2013, DLA will start to be replaced by Person Independence Payment which will
differ from DLA in certain details (Welfare Reform Act, 2012).
2In 2007, the year to which our data relate, the two rates of AA were £64.50 or £43.15. In 2007 the
levels of DLA were such that weekly payments ranged from £17.75 to £109.50.
3Worth up to £48.45 in 2007 for an older disabled person receiving a means-tested beneﬁt.
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is not feasible to use expert judgment at the level of individual respondents to
large-scale surveys. Disabled people themselves may also ﬁnd it difﬁcult to envis-
age and evaluate the counterfactual situation in which their disability is removed
but all else remains constant.
A third “objective” revealed preference approach constructs an equivalence
scale by using the consumption pattern (typically the household’s food budget
share) as an indicator of living standards in a comparison of a sample of disabled
people with matched individuals who are unaffected by disability. This has been
done extensively in the context of adjustment for household size and structure, but
less often for disability (although see Jones and O’Donnell, 1995 for a U.K.
example). The main difﬁculty with this revealed preference method is the need for
strong assumptions to overcome inherent identiﬁcation problems (Muellbauer,
1979; Pollak and Wales, 1979; Coulter et al., 1992; Banks et al., 1997; Deaton and
Paxson, 1998).
A fourth alternative is to use a “subjective” equivalence approach, based on
individuals’ reported satisfaction with their well-being. Two main types of subjec-
tive information have been used: evaluations of standard of living using an arbi-
trary numerical scale; or judgments on the level of income believed necessary to
reach a speciﬁed standard of living (see Stewart, 2009). For the subjective
approach, there are concerns about the quality of subjective assessments and the
failure to address problems caused by measurement error.
In this paper, we pursue a ﬁfth and less widely-used standard of living (SoL)
approach which lies somewhere between these last two approaches. The method is
closely related to work on material deprivation which seeks to expand the concept
of poverty beyond conventional income- or consumption-based constructs (see
Berthoud et al., 1993; Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Cullinan et al., 2011). We
assume that disabled people, in diverting resources to goods and services which
are required because of disability, experience a lower SoL than their non-disabled
counterparts. The absolute costs of disability can be identiﬁed as the additional
income required by a disabled person to reach the same SoL as a non-disabled
person, holding constant other characteristics, and the relative cost is the ratio of
this amount to income. As Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) point out, estimates depend
on the choice of a suitable standard of living indicator and the form of its rela-
tionship to income and disability status.
Our aim is to develop and improve the method further in two important
respects. First, we allow for a more ﬂexible relationship between income and SoL,
so that the structure of the estimated disability cost and equivalence scale is not
dictated by an unduly restrictive functional form assumption. Second, we address
the problem of measurement error in disability and SoL. Both SoL and disability
status are typically measured using either a binary classiﬁcation or a count index
based on a range of different questionnaire items.4 Although sensitivity analyses
4The Katz activities of daily living (Katz et al., 1963) and Barthel indices (Mahoney and Barthel,
1965) are two widely used tools for assessing ability to perform activities of daily living. These indices
assign scores to self-reported degrees of difﬁculty in performing a number of activities, such as feeding,
dressing, moving, bathing etc. Scores for each item are then aggregated. These indices have been
criticized for the way reported difﬁculties are aggregated and for not taking account of potential
measurement errors in self-reported difﬁculties (Feinstein et al., 1986; Hartigan, 2007).
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are often used to assess robustness, this is not effective if all the alternatives entail
similar measurement error biases. To address this we use a latent factor model for
disability and SoL, which explicitly allows for the existence of measurement errors
in the observable indicators.
Using a two-latent factor structural equation model we estimate the extra cost
of disability for a representative sample of people over state pension age living in
private households in Great Britain, who were interviewed in the 2007/08 Family
Resources Survey (FRS). Ten indicators of ability to afford particular items or
activities are used to construct a latent continuous index of SoL. The latent SoL is
modeled as a function of income, (latent) disability, and other characteristics,
which reﬂect the many factors which determine an individual’s achieved standard
of living. In line with previous work (Hancock et al., 2013), disability is assumed to
be a latent concept which can be measured imperfectly by a vector of survey
indicators reﬂecting difﬁculties in domains of life and is inﬂuenced by observed
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the individual.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the standard
of living approach and its usage. Section 3 presents the latent-factor structural
equation framework we employ. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5
presents estimates of the structural equation model and derives the associated
estimated extra costs of disability. Section 6 reports some sensitivity analysis on
the initial results. The ﬁnal section draws conclusions.
2. The Standard of Living Method
Berthoud (1991) reviews various early attempts at conceptualizing and
quantifying how SoL, income, and disability are related. Berthoud et al. (1993)
and Zaidi and Burchardt (2005) formalized this approach, which has also been
used by Saunders (2007) and Cullinan et al. (2011) for estimating the cost of
disability in Australia and Ireland, respectively. The SoL approach is illustrated
in Figure 1, where we compare a positive level of disability D with the baseline of
non-disability, D0.
The two curves plot the relation between income and SoL conditional on
disability, and are assumed to increase monotonically with income. For any given
value of income, the SoL of the disabled person lies below that of the non-disabled
person and the vertical distance AC measures the difference in their standards
of living at the level of income Y. This measure is similar to Sen’s concept of
“conversion handicap” (Doessel and Williams, 2011). The horizontal distance
AB provides a measure of the extra income (Δ) required to bring the SoL of the
disabled person up to the same level as the non-disabled person.
To formalize this idea, consider the following additively separable SoL
function:
(1) S f Y g D h X= ( ) − ( ) + ( ), ε
where S is the SoL, Y is a measure of ﬁnancial resources, D is the degree
of disability status, and X and ε represent other observable and unobservable
individual characteristics. Some individuals may be in receipt of disability beneﬁt
(B), others may not. To allow for this, we decompose income as:
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(2) Y Y B= +0
where Y0 excludes disability beneﬁts. Now deﬁne a reference level of disability D0
and assume that the reference non-disabled person receives no disability beneﬁt.
We now pose the following question: what is the smallest amount of additional
income, over and above Y0, that would be needed for a person with disability level
D to achieve the same SoL as he or she would have with income Y0 and disability
reduced to the reference levelD0? Given the additivity of (1), this additional income
need, Δ, is independent of X and ε, and solves the following optimization problem:
(3) min subject toΔ Δ: .f Y g D f Y g D0 0 0+( ) − ( ) ≥ ( ) − ( )
In general, the total disability-induced living cost Δ and the associated propor-
tional equivalence scale σ = (Y0 + Δ)/Y0 depend on the levels of both income Y0
and disability.
For the cost Δ to depend only on severity of disability D (as implied by the
design of some beneﬁt systems), the income–SoL proﬁle must have the linear form
f(Y0) = γ1Y0, in which case the cost of disability and associated equivalence scale are:
(4) Δ = ( ) − ( ) = + ( ) − ( )( )
g D g D g D g D
f Y
0
1
0
0
1
γ
σ; .
For the equivalence scale σ to depend only on disability would require
f (Y0 + Δ) = f (σY0) to be expressible as f (Y0) + a(σ), for all positive σ and some
function a(.). The only function satisfying this property is f (Y0) = γ1ln(Y0), which
implies the following cost of disability and equivalence scale:5
5Strictly speaking, f can be any afﬁne transform of ln(Y0); but an additive translation has no effect.
Figure 1. Standard of Living, Income, and Disability
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(5) Δ = −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
=
( )− ( ) ( )− ( )
Y e e
g D g D g D g D
0
0
1
0
11γ γσ; .
This is the form usually adopted for equivalence scales designed to adjust for
demographic differences between households in conventional income inequality
analysis. Both the linear and log-linear speciﬁcations have the advantage of sim-
plicity and incorporate the property of base independence (or invariance of the
equivalence scale to income level) in additive or multiplicative form (Lewbel,
1997).
In addition to these standard forms, we also use a more ﬂexible log-quadratic
function of the kind that has been found useful in Engel curve studies (Banks et al.,
1997) and embodies the constant-σ model as a special case. If f (Y0) is speciﬁed as:
(6) f Y Y Y0 1 0 2 0
2( ) = ( ) + ( )[ ]γ γln ln
then the solution to (3) gives the cost of disability and equivalence scale as:
(7) Δ = − − ( ) −⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
−exp
sgn C
Y
γ γ γ γ
γ
1 2 1
2
2
2
0
4
2
(8) σ
γ γ γ γ
γ
=
− − ( ) −⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
−Y exp
sgn C
0
1 1 2 1
2
2
2
4
2
where C = −[γ 1ln(Y0) + γ 2[ln(Y0)]2 + g(D) − g(D0)]. Note that this solution requires
the condition C ≤ γ γ12 24 to be satisﬁed.
This emphasizes the importance of the speciﬁcation used to relate SoL to
income and the need to allow for the possibility of departures from the simple
assumptions of linear or log-linear forms.
3. A Statistical Model
We use the following two-latent factor simultaneous equation model:
(9) Siq q i iq= +( )1 λ ϕ ζ
(10) Dik k i ik= +( )1 μ η ξ
(11) ϕ α η εi i i i if Y= ( ) + + +; g a1 2 1x
(12) η εi i i= +bz 2
where i denotes sampled individuals (i = 1 . . . N), f (.) represents the linear,
log-linear, or log-quadratic function and γ contains the corresponding coefﬁcients.
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The latent measure of SoL is φi which underlies the observed SoL indicators Si1 . . .
SiQ, and the latent disability index ηi generates observed disability indicators Di1
. . .DiK. The parameters λq and μk are factor loadings associated with the Siq andDik
indicators, respectively. ζiq and ξik are the measurement errors associated with the
SoL and disability indicators. The indicator function 1(.) maps the latent indexes
on the right-hand side of the measurement equations (9) and (10) into the observed
binary indicators of SoL and disability.
Observable covariates representing personal characteristics and household
circumstances appear in vectors xi and zi. They contain socio-economic and demo-
graphic inﬂuences on living standards and disability, respectively. In this model
socio-economic factors have both a direct and an indirect effect on SoL. Income, for
example, has the direct effect of increasing resources available for consumption;
this is captured by the function f (Yi; γ). Income also has an indirect inﬂuence
on disability, through the term βzi, which then increases disability-related costs
through the termα1ηi. The use of a latent disabilitymodel allows us to separate these
direct and indirect effects. Note that the income concepts relevant to the direct and
indirect paths are different. The direct effect involves current resources available for
consumption, which includes receipt of disability beneﬁt. In contrast, modeling of
the indirect effect requires a long-term concept of economic resources reﬂecting the
cumulative effect of past living standards on the current health state. Since disability
precedes the receipt of disability beneﬁt, it follows that the latter should be excluded
from the income variable used to capture the indirect causal path.
Weuse the standard normalizations corr(ε1, ε2) = 0 and var(ε1) = var(ε2) = 1 for
the structural errors and assume the measurement errors ζiq and ξik to be indepen-
dent. Because units of measurement for φ and η are arbitrary, we show coefﬁ-
cient estimates in standardized form. The variance of the latent SoL index in (11)
is 1 2−( )Rϕ , where Rϕ2 is the squared multiple correlation of φ, so the standardized
form of φ implies multiplying each coefﬁcient by a factor 1 2
1 2
−( )−Rϕ , so that each
coefﬁcient is interpretable as the change in φ in standard deviation units, produced
by a 1-unit increase in the value of the covariate. Disability η is also a latent
construct, with variance var Ribz( ) + = −( )1 1 2η , where Rη2 is the squared multiple
correlation of the disability equation. Therefore the standardized coefﬁcient of φ
on η is α α η ϕ1 1
2 21 1STD R R= −( ) −( )[ ], which can be interpreted as the change in φ
(in standard deviation units) generated by a 1-standard deviation increase in η.
4. Data
The data are from the 2007–08 Family Resources Survey (FRS): a large U.K.
household survey collecting detailed income and assets information from res-
pondents and asking questions covering difﬁculties due to ill-health or disability
(Department for Work and Pensions et al., 2009). The survey also includes a series
of questions aimed at measuring material deprivation (Department for Work and
Pensions, 2009b). For this paper we restrict the analysis to households in Great
Britain where all members are over state pension age (65 for men; 60 for women)
and the household contains only a single person or a couple. The age restriction is
imposed in order to limit endogeneity bias which may arise for younger adults for
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whom disability may cause a reduced income by limiting labor market participa-
tion.6 In estimating equations (11) and (12) we measure income at the household
level, assuming that all members of the households beneﬁt to the same extent from
total household income. This is less likely to be true for households containing
members other than a single or couple pensioner. After dropping a few cases where
relevant information is missing, the resulting sample contains 8,183 individuals
(5,812 households). About 58 percent of the sample are partnered and the remain-
der live alone. We retain proxy cases (4.8 percent) where the required data were
provided by a proxy respondent (often a carer). Dropping proxy cases would bias
the sample toward the less severely disabled.
Deprivation indicators are derived from a set of questions about items or
activities, seen as potential “necessities”; households who did not have the items
or do the activities were asked whether this was because they did not want them or
because they could not afford them. They were also given the option of saying that
an item or activity did not apply to them.7 From these household-level indicators,
we created individual-level indicators in which each household member is assigned
the values of the deprivation indicators of their household. Each indicator is set
to 1 if the respondent answered “We/I would like to have this but cannot afford
this at the moment” and 0 otherwise. Thus we allow for differences in prefer-
ences to explain non-consumption rather than assuming that non-consumption
always implies deprivation. However, it has been suggested (McKay, 2004, 2008;
Berthoud et al., 2009) that certain segments of the population with lowered expec-
tations, such as disabled older people, may be less likely than others to admit to
being unable to afford particular activities or goods. We have carried out two
sensitivity analyses by: (i) using a restricted subset of the indicators; and (ii) using
a less stringent interpretation of the responses. Results are given in Section 6.
In estimating equations (9)–(12), we invert these deprivation indicators
to construct the SoL indicators, Siq, taking the value 0 if the respondent cannot
afford the activity/good and 1 otherwise. Sample statistics corresponding to the
two alternative deﬁnitions of deprivation are shown in Appendix Table A1.
Overall, 35 percent of the sample report an inability to afford at least one item,
a proportion which rises to 80 percent under the less stringent interpretation.
FRS respondents are asked whether they have a health problem or disability
and, if they answer “yes” they are asked if they have signiﬁcant difﬁculties in
each of nine areas of life. The prevalence rates for these disability indicators are
reported in Appendix Table A1. Overall, 53 percent of the sample reported having
no disability and 20 percent reported three or more difﬁculties. The most common
difﬁculties are those concerning physical impairment (difﬁculties in mobility; with
lifting, carrying, or moving objects).
The explanatory covariates used in the SoL and disability equations
are summarized in Appendix Table A2. The income indicator Y used in the
6For a discussion on this point we refer, amongst others, to Goldman (2001) and Adams et al.
(2003).
7Taking the ability to afford to replace worn out furniture as an example, respondents who rent
furnished properties may not be responsible for replacing furniture and therefore select “does not
apply.” In fact only 2.5 percent of the sample replied “does not apply” to at least one of the deprivation
indicators.
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SoL equation represents the resources of the household currently available for
meeting the consumption needs of the household members. We use a household-
level income measure, net of direct taxes and housing costs, similar to the “After
Housing Cost” measure used in the ofﬁcial Households Below Average Income
analysis (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a) and also by Zaidi and
Burchardt (2005). This measure represents the disposable income available for
spending on the items and activities used as indicators of SoL. We argue that the
treatment of housing as a ﬁxed cost is reasonable in our target population, since
adjustment of housing as a response to disability often takes the form of transition
into the care home sector or moving into a multi-generation household. Never-
theless, we report a sensitivity test in Section 6.
Our income measure includes income from investments (interest, rent, divi-
dends, private pensions, annuities). It includes disability beneﬁts since, as argued
earlier, they are available, like any other income component, to be used to main-
tain SoL (see also Zaidi and Burchardt, 2005; Stapleton et al., 2008; Cullinan et al.,
2011). Disability beneﬁts comprise the non-means-tested Attendance Allowance
and Disability Living Allowance, an estimate of income attributable to the Severe
Disability Premium component of means-tested pensioner beneﬁts and other
minor disability-related beneﬁts that are received by a small number of older
people in our sample.
The income measure used as a covariate in the disability equation also
includes income from investments, since interest, rent, dividends, private pensions,
and annuities are returns on assets accumulated over the lifecycle and are, conse-
quently, good indicators of past access to resources with a cumulative positive
inﬂuence on health. For the same reason, we also include a measure of ﬁnancial
wealth8 in the disability equation and a dummy variable to indicate home owner-
ship. Note that the income measure used as a covariate in the disability equation
excludes current receipt of disability beneﬁts, since those are a consequence, rather
than a determinant, of current disability. Rather than use an arbitrary equivalence
scale to adjust income for household composition, we include a dummy variable
to indicate whether the household contains a single person or a couple in the
disability and SoL equations. In line with previous work (Zaidi and Burchardt,
2005; Stewart, 2009), we also use a set of personal characteristics including age,
gender, level of education, home ownership, and marital status, together with
regional dummies to reﬂect geographical differences in cost of living and in health.
5. Parameter Estimates and Analysis
5.1. Estimates of the Structural Equation Model
Estimation results for the model comprising equations (9)–(12) are presented
in Appendix Tables A3–A5.9 The log-quadratic form of the SoL equation ﬁts the
8Deposit and saving account balances, stocks, bonds, certiﬁcate deposits, and other savings held by
the household. The information recording the amount of liquid wealth in FRS was severely affected by
non-response, which we deal with by imputation based on grossing up investment income. Financial
wealth is not used as a covariate in the SoL equation.
9Estimates were computed using the robust maximum likelihood estimator ofMplus 6.11 (Muthén
and Muthén, 2010).
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data best. The estimated measurement equations (9) and (10) using this form of the
SoL equation, are summarized in Appendix Table A3. They show respectively
the factor loadings λq which capture the effect of the latent standard of living index
φ on the indicators Sq, and the factor loadings μk associated with the disability
score η. We also report the squared correlation of each indicator with the under-
lying latent construct. The factor loadings are all positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Being unable to afford to replace/renew durable goods or to keep the home in a
decent state of decoration are the most sensitive indicators of the latent SoL
construct φ; the inability to afford house insurance, hobbies, or leisure activities
are the least sensitive. The highest correlation with the latent disability construct is
found for indicators of difﬁculties with mobility, lifting, and dexterity, while lower
correlations are found for indicators of cognitive disability.
Results reported in Appendix Table A4 show that the conditional mean of η
increases almost linearly with age, although we allowed for non-linearity using
a spline function of age, with a single node at the median age 73 observed in the
sample. The structural estimates provide no evidence of a signiﬁcant relation with
gender. Indicators measuring economic well-being are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level: more educated individuals experienced a low level of disability as
well as those with high current pre-disability beneﬁt income. A negative relation
between wealth and disability emerges, in terms of both housing wealth (captured
by owner-occupation) and ﬁnancial wealth.
Income and receipt of disability beneﬁts by decile of latent disability are
displayed in Table 1. Average weekly post-disability beneﬁt household income (Y)
is reported per-capita and without adjustment for household composition. The
TABLE 1
Mean Income and Receipt of Disability Benefits by Deciles of Latent Disability
Decile
of ηˆ
Mean Ya
£s pw
% of Individuals
Receiving
Disability
Beneﬁts
% of Individual
Disability Beneﬁt
Recipients in Each
Disability Decile
Average Amount
Of Disability
Beneﬁtb Received
£s pw
Per
Capita
Unadjusted for
Household
Composition
1 263.90 442.90 1.8 1.2 1.20
2 206.00 353.10 3.2 2.0 1.90
3 187.40 309.10 3.6 2.3 2.30
4 162.80 257.70 5.0 3.2 2.70
5 141.30 203.80 6.9 4.4 4.00
6 148.70 221.50 10.3 6.6 6.30
7 172.20 264.10 15.5 10.0 10.00
8 175.50 263.80 24.1 15.4 15.70
9 174.10 255.50 35.6 22.8 23.50
10 181.70 264.10 50.1 32.1 37.80
Mean for
deciles
6 to 10
170.40 253.80 27.1 86.9 18.60
Notes: Statistics computed over a sample of 8,183 FRS 2007-8 respondents. All monetary values
are rounded to the nearest 10p and expressed in 2007 prices.
aHousehold income including disability beneﬁt.
bMeasured at the individual level.
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association between disability and socio-economic status is widely recognized (see,
for instance, Goldman, 2001; Cutler et al., 2011 for a review) although the extent
to which this association reﬂects causality is still in debate (Conti et al., 2010).
Similarly we ﬁnd that there is a strong association between disability and per-
capita income which declines monotonically until the ﬁfth decile of η and is almost
ﬂat afterwards. Thus poor health and low income are strongly associated even if
the measure of income used, as here, includes the disability beneﬁt that individuals
receive. The last three columns of Table 1 show the percentage of individuals in the
sample in receipt of any disability beneﬁt by decile of latent disability, the propor-
tions of those recipients who are in each disability decile, and the average amount
of disability beneﬁts received by individuals in each disability decile. The propor-
tion of individuals in the sample who receive these beneﬁts ranges from under
2 percent in the lowest disability decile to 50 percent in the top decile. Overall,
amongst those in the upper half of the disability distribution the percentage is
27 percent. Although current disability beneﬁts appear well targeted on disabled
people, a signiﬁcant proportion of those who face severe disability do not receive
disability beneﬁts. Non take-up of disability beneﬁts among disabled people has
been noted elsewhere (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Pudney, 2010) and the receipt
of disability beneﬁt may often be delayed by several years after disability onset
(Zantomio, 2013).
Estimates for the regression coefﬁcients of the SoL equation are reported
in Appendix Table A5, using three different functional forms of f(Y): the linear-
in-income model (model 1); the linear-in-log income model (model 2); and the
quadratic-in-log income model (model 3). Age, level of education, home owner-
ship, marital status, and region of residence are found to be highly signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level and their signs, for the most part, are as expected. A gender dummy
is not signiﬁcant. Here, we focus on the structural parameters of interest in deriv-
ing the equivalence scale (Table 2). The structural estimates of the α1 and γ provide
TABLE 2
The Standard of Living Equation: Parameter Estimates (in Standardized Form) for Latent
Disability and Income
Parameter(s):
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Linear in Y Linear in ln(Y) Quadratic in ln(Y)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
α1
STD −0.233*** 0.016 −0.254*** 0.016 −0.236*** 0.016
γ 1STD 0.003*** 0.001 0.631*** 0.026 −2.610*** 0.201
γ 2STD 0.307*** 0.019
Free parameters 74 74 75
Log-likelihood −38,718.413 −38,759.401 −38,694.623
Correction for
non-normality factor
1.004 0.992 0.994
AIC 77,584.826 77,666.803 77,539.247
BIC 78,103.552 78,185.529 78,064.983
Notes: Signiﬁcance: * = 10%; ** = 5%, *** = 1%. Models also include regional dummy variables
and controls for socio-economic characteristics which are reported in Appendix Table A5. The R2 of
models (1), (2), and (3) are 0.384, 0.334, and 0.382, respectively.
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strong evidence that latent disability and current income affect the SoL. Increased
disability is associated with lower values of the SoL index, while income is posi-
tively associated with the SoL, no matter which functional form is used. Holding
other variables constant, a 1-standard deviation increase in disability η produces a
reduction of 0.233 standard deviations in φ using model 1, 0.254 using model 2,
and 0.236 using model 3. The estimated income coefﬁcients imply that a £10
increase in weekly income increases SoL by 0.03 standard deviations in model 1
and in model 2; a 10 percent increase in net income produces an increase of about
0.0631 standard deviations in the SoL. In model 3, the coefﬁcient associated with
the added square of log household income is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level,
implying a signiﬁcant non-linear relationship of income and the SoL index φ.
Thus, controlling for disability level, disability costs appear to vary with income in
both absolute terms and as a proportion of income.
At the bottom of Table 2 we report the number of free estimated regression
parameters, the maximized log-likelihood and its correction for non-normality
factor, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information
criterion (BIC) for the model comprising equations (9)–(12). According to these
measures the quadratic-in-log form (model 3) ﬁts the data best but, as the plots in
Appendix Figure A1 show, its implications are remarkably close to those of the
linear speciﬁcation.
We might also want to include covariates in the SoL equation which capture
the value of any informal (i.e., unpaid for) and subsidized formal care received by
the person, as such care may affect the living standard a disabled person can
achieve from a given level of income. Informal care received by another member of
the household can be ignored as it represents a within-household transfer rather
than an addition to household resources. The FRS contains limited information
on receipt of informal care from non-household members and formal care
although whether and how much that care was subsidized by the state is not
directly recorded. We experimented with adding covariates for hours of informal
care received from non-household members and hours of care from a Local
Authority or nurse, in the SoL equation (income entered in log-quadratic form).
None of the estimated coefﬁcients was statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level and the estimated coefﬁcients for latent disability and income were only very
marginally changed by the inclusion of these additional covariates. In subsequent
analysis we therefore use the models without covariates measuring receipt of care.
5.2. Disability Costs and Equivalence Scales
Using the parameter estimates in Table 2, we can derive the relative/absolute
costs of disability for any reference level of disabilityD0 as the minimal compensat-
ing amount (3). First, we calculate the model-based posterior prediction ηˆ as the
estimate of the expectation of η conditional on all observed information for the
individual. Then we calculate the estimate of disability cost as (4), (5), or (7) eva-
luated at the point ηˆ and thus the means of these estimated costs by decile of ηˆ.10
10Note that this is a conservative estimate, for the log-linear and (to a lesser extent) the log-
quadratic model. Because of the convexity of the exp(.) function in (5) and (7), the true average cost will
be understated: to a degree that depends on the posterior variance of η.
Review of Income and Wealth 2014
© 2014 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
12
Since we use a continuous measure of disability, the deﬁnition of D0 is less
straightforward than when using a dichotomous indicator. We can think of D0 as
a reference level of disability above which some ﬁnancial compensation is judged
appropriate, but how should this reference level be chosen? Table 3 reports the
prevalence of reported difﬁculties by decile of ηˆ . As noted in Section 4, about 53
percent of the sample reported having no disability. All individuals who fall in the
highest four deciles of ηˆ reported at least one disability, most having a difﬁculty
with mobility, and lifting, carrying, or moving objects. The mean number of
reported disabilities increases non-linearly with position in the latent disability
distribution. It is clear from Table 3 that there is a deﬁnite discontinuity at the
median and, as a consequence, we adopt the median level of ηˆ (D0 = 0.972) as our
reference level. Appendix Figure A2 shows the empirical kernel distribution of the
predicted disability index ηˆ from the log-quadratic model.
Estimated costs of disability are presented in Table 4. There are 260 cases (out
of 8183 in the estimation sample) where the condition C ≤ γ γ12 24 in equation (8)
is violated. All have a combination of low income (mean £88 compared to £290 for
the full sample) and low estimated latent disability (mean 0.65 compared to 1.40).
In the calculations reported below, we set their disability costs to zero (dropping
cases with very low income and disability leads to virtually identical estimates).
Average estimated disability costs (Δ) and the equivalence scale (σ) computed
among people in the upper 50 percent of the disability distribution are displayed in
Table 4 by deciles of ηˆ (panel a) and by deciles of household income (panel b) for
each of the three model variants. From panel (a), we see that on average, a person
in the upper 50 percent of the disability distribution requires an additional £90
to reach the same standard of living as a comparable person at the median level of
disability, according to the linear model. Average disability costs are about £17 per
week in the sixth decile of the disability distribution, rising to £164 in the top decile.
For the log-linear speciﬁcation the estimated disability costs are higher (about
£154 per week for those in the upper 50 percent of disability) and they increase
TABLE 3
Self-Reported Difficulties by Decile of ηˆ
Decile of ηˆ
% of Those Who Reported
Number of
Difﬁculties
Reported
Any
Difﬁculties
Difﬁculties with Mobility,
Lifting, Carrying or
Moving Objects
1 0.0% 0.0% 0.00
2 0.0% 0.0% 0.00
3 0.0% 0.0% 0.00
4 0.2% 0.0% 0.00
5 5.5% 0.0% 0.06
6 63.2% 2.3% 0.67
7 100.0% 91.8% 1.22
8 100.0% 98.4% 2.22
9 100.0% 100.0% 3.03
10 100.0% 100.0% 4.97
Mean 46.9% 39.2% 1.22
Notes: Statistics computed over a sample of 8,183 FRS 2007–08 respondents.
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more sharply with disability. The log-quadratic model generates estimates which
are much closer to those of the linear model, but with slightly higher values in the
upper tail of the disability distribution. The estimated average cost of disability
among the upper 50 percent of disabled people is about £99 per week; in the top
decile of disability it is £180. Panel (b) of Table 4 reports equivalence scales and
disability costs among disabled people by deciles of per capita pre-disability beneﬁt
income. It demonstrates that the ﬂexible log-quadratic model allows for a more
complex relationship between income and estimated disability costs/equivalence
scales than the other two models. Under the log-quadratic model the estimated
costs of disability are greatest for the lowest and highest income deciles. The
estimated equivalence scale is largest for the lowest income decile.
It is clear that the equivalence scale, σ increases with disability.11 If we deﬁne
a disabled person as someone with a disability in the top half of the disability
distribution, an older disabled person requires, on average, an increase of about
55 percent of net weekly pre-disability household income (Y0) to reach the same
standard of living as a comparable non-disabled person, according to the linear
model. Average disability costs are about 11 percent of Y0 in the sixth decile of the
disability distribution, rising to 106 percent in the top decile. For the log-linear
speciﬁcation, estimated disability costs are about 65 percent higher on average
in the disabled population and increase more sharply with disability. The
log-quadratic model generates estimates which are much closer to those of the
log-linear model, but with slightly lower values in the upper tail of the disability
distribution. The average extra cost of disability is about 62 percent of the net
weekly pre-disability household income.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we assess the sensitivity of our results to: (i) the assumption
that the costs of disability and the equivalence scale are independent of household
composition; (ii) the income deﬁnition; and (iii) the construction of the SoL
measure.
Demographic Invariance
The three models of the previous section imply invariance of the equivalence
scale to household size and structure. This has the advantage that a beneﬁt system
with the same property does not create incentives for potential claimants to change
their household type to increase their level of entitlement (Pendakur, 1999). We
test whether estimates of the best-ﬁtting quadratic model are sensitive to the
assumption of demographic invariance by using a two-group analysis where we
allow the parameters of the SoL equations (9) and (11) to differ for respondents
from single-person and two-person households. In contrasting this with the
11By construction, σ obtained using models 1 and 2 is lower than 1 for those individuals who fall
below the median level of disability [g(D) < g(D0)] and increases afterwards. However, nothing prevents
the equivalence scale derived from model 3 for some people with disability level below D0 from being
greater than 1. That is because the equivalence scale derived from speciﬁcation 3, while increasing in
disability, is decreasing in income. In practice this occurs for only 1.07 percent of the sample.
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unrestricted model, the Akaike information criterion suggests that the unrestricted
model provides a slightly better balance of model ﬁt and parsimony. Panel (1) in
Table 5 shows the equivalence scale and the extra cost of disability computed for
single people and couples, by disability index η. It should be noticed however, that
about 58 percent of single people, compared with 44 percent of couples, belong
to the top four deciles of ηˆ. Thus single people (mainly widows) on average
experience higher disability levels than people in couples (see also Zaidi and
Burchardt, 2005). On the other hand, household income (not adjusted for
household composition) of people in couples is generally higher than for single
people. Therefore the reduction in the living standard caused by a given disability
level is higher (lower) in relative (absolute) terms for single people than for couples.
Housing Wealth and Housing Costs
A further sensitivity analysis makes some allowance for housing wealth. We
re-estimate equations (9)–(12) adding to the income variables in equations (11)
and (12) an annual return from the (estimated) house wealth of 2 and 4 percent,
respectively.12 This increases the household incomemeasure only for the 76 percent
of people who are owner occupiers. Estimates of equivalence scales and the extra
costs of disability using a 2 and 4 percent return on housing wealth are remarkably
close to the base case and are reported in panel (2) of Table 5. We also test the
extent to which our estimates are sensitive to the treatment of housing costs in
the income measure. On average, housing costs (which are the sum of gross rents,
council tax payments, costs of insurance on structure of property, and mortgage
interest payments net of housing beneﬁt and council tax beneﬁts) are of about
£8 lower for disabled people compared with the non-disabled counterpart. Using
a “Before Housing Costs” income measure (see discussion in Section 4) yields
an estimate of the average extra cost of disability among disabled people of £93
(about £6 lower than when income is measured after housing costs).
SoL Indicators
We used two sensitivity tests focused on disability measurement. First,
dropping the indicators for “hobby or leisure activity,” “holidays away from
home,” and “friends and family round” produced very little change in the esti-
mates.13 Second, we used a less stringent interpretation, setting each indicator to
0 even in cases where respondents replied “We/I do not want/need this.” This
produced a slightly lower coefﬁcient (−0.272) for disability, a higher γ 1STD (−1.793),
12Estimates of housing wealth are derived by estimating an interval regression using recorded
Council Tax band information and a set of controlling characteristics available in the FRS. Council
Tax is a local property tax for which all domestic properties have been valued and the value placed in
a band. This regression gives us a vector of estimated coefﬁcients which we use to derive homeowners’
expected housing wealth conditional on being in the respondent council tax band, evaluated at the time
when their properties were last valued (1991 for England and Scotland and 2005 in Wales). Finally,
observed regional changes in house prices between then and 2007 are applied to yield estimated housing
wealth in 2007 prices. Return on housings wealth is then computed at a weekly basis (dividing the
assumed annual return by 52).
13We estimated α1
STD, γ 1STD, and γ 2STD as −0.236, −2.660, and 0.311, respectively, compared with
−0.236, −2.610, and 0.307 for the baseline model.
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and lower γ 2STD (0.217), yielding an estimate of the extra cost of disability among
disabled people of about 89 percent of their household income. Results are shown
in panel (3) of Table 5.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have applied the standard of living approach to estimate the
cost of disability among older people in Great Britain and extended previous
research by developing a two-latent factor structural model to estimate equi-
valence scales for disability. Disability is treated as a latent construct which
is measured imperfectly by a vector of survey indicators and is inﬂuenced by
observed socio-economic characteristics. Ten indicators of deprivation are used
as observable counterparts of the latent continuous index of SoL, which varies in
relation to household income and disability. Our approach allows us to construct
a base-dependent equivalence scale (i.e., one which varies by income level) which
takes account of the severity of disability. The restrictions on preferences imposed
by the assumption of a base-independent equivalence scale for disability are not
supported by our data. This implies that the extra income that disabled people on
higher incomes need to be as well off as their non-disabled counterparts is lower
than the equivalent sum needed by disabled people on lower incomes. Our appli-
cation is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to derive an equivalence scale for disability
using a log-quadratic function on income of the kind that has been used in Engel
curve studies.
The results show that the extra costs of disability are substantial, and rise
with severity. Using the 2007/08 wave of the FRS we estimate that an older
disabled person, deﬁned as someone above the median level of disability for all
older people, requires a net household income around 62 percent higher than that
of a comparable person with a median level of disability to reach the same stan-
dard of living. This corresponds to around £99 per week on average as an allow-
ance for the additional costs that households with a disabled member face. These
additional costs where disability is in the highest decile of disability average £180
under our preferred model. The latter is comparable with disability costs for
highly disabled pensioners estimated by Zaidi and Burchardt (2005), which
ranged from £122 to £190 (converted to 2007 prices from £104 to £162 in 2002
prices).
Only about 27 percent of those whom we estimate to face disability-related
costs, are in receipt of disability-related cash beneﬁts. In line with previous ﬁndings
(Thompson et al., 1990; Berthoud et al., 1993) we ﬁnd evidence that, although
disability beneﬁts are received mainly by people who do indeed face disability
costs, they do not meet the full costs of disability for recipients, and a high
proportion of people with severe disability do not receive disability beneﬁts at all.
We have also investigated the sensitivity of our estimates to various aspects
of the econometric speciﬁcation, the measurement of SoL, and the treatment of
housing wealth and costs. Estimates obtained using the preferred quadratic model
are remarkably close to those obtained when a simple linear-in-income form is
used. The estimates are sensitive to whether the disability costs and equivalence
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scales are constrained to be the same for single people and couples: the reduction
in living standards for a given disability level appears to be higher (but not parallel)
for single people than for couples. This is in contrast to Zaidi and Burchardt
(2005), who found that disability costs were higher for single people than for
couples. As a consequence there is more divergence between our and their esti-
mates when single people and couples are distinguished. Zaidi and Burchardt
found that highly disabled single pensioners faced extra costs of around £189 (2007
prices) compared with our estimate for single pensioners in the highest decile of
disability of £147. The equivalent comparison for couples is £122 against our
higher ﬁgure of £197. Thus while there is evidence that disability beneﬁts systems
should discriminate between single people and couples, more research is needed
before ﬁrm recommendations for policy can be made. Our estimates are only
marginally sensitive to the inclusion of the return on housing wealth in income.
The estimated equivalence scale is very sensitive to the way answers to survey
questions on deprivation are interpreted. If we were to interpret all cases of
non-possession as equivalent to deprivation, we would estimate that an older
disabled person requires a net household income around 89 percent higher than a
comparable non-disabled person to reach the same standard of living, compared
with 62 percent when the index is based only on explicit inability to afford.
Our clear—and robust—conclusion is that disability costs faced by older
people in Britain are large and increase strongly with severity of disability. Com-
parisons of the incomes of disabled and non-disabled older people must make
adequate allowance for these costs if meaningful inferences about their relative
living standards are to be drawn.
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